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Abstract 
 
With a growing population, there are risks to food security that would negatively affect a 
great proportion of the global population. Dairy is a particularly valuable dietary resource that 
feeds a large proportion of the global population. One key potential constraint on growth of milk 
production is disease. Disease management is crucial to preserving food security and profits for 
the public and private markets, respectively. Johne’s Disease (JD) is a contagious, chronic and 
often fatal infection that primarily affects the small intestines of ruminants. Disease management 
currently includes solutions such as cull-and-kill, best-management practices, vaccinations, and 
disease testing kits. Current vaccines and tests for JD result in false positive results for 
tuberculosis (TB), caused by the pathogens Mycobacterium tuberculosis (M. tb, the human 
variant) and Mycobacterium bovis (M. bovis, the bovine variant). When positive TB results are 
triggered, either due to the presence of the disease or due to false-positives, governments 
quarantine the suspected product. Often this involves quarantine of infected farms, extermination 
of the animals, extended-cease production orders for infected farms and withdrawals and 
destruction of any suspected contaminated products from the market. The feasibility of a range 
of potential solutions is explored. The capacity of various institutions and actors to implement 
any solution is explained using the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework. 
Maintaining food security is a concern for the broader public, but the benefits and costs of JD 
management are distributed among various actors in the private market as well, making JD 
management a common pool good. The thesis illuminates a range of disease management 
options, assesses the incentives and impacts of various options for controlling JD and preserving 
food security, and offers insights into the best way to implement the optimal solution.   
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Section 1:  
Introduction 
 
 
With a growing global population, there are risks to food security that would negatively 
affect a great proportion of the global population. Milk is a particularly valuable dietary resource 
that feeds a large proportion of the global population and provides essential nutrients – calcium, 
protein, iodine, potassium, phosphorus and vitamins B2 and B12. Globally, the dairy bovine 
sector is one of the most widely produced and valuable agricultural commodities, with 2013 
production of 770 billion litres of milk valued at 328 billion USD (Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, 2014). Milk production is a key component of any food 
security strategy as milk contains energy, protein, and vital micronutrients (Westenhöfer, 2013). 
As of 2016, dairy manufacturing shipments from Canada totaled C$399 million, with a dairy 
cattle population of 1.4 million head (Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 2018).  
One key potential constraint on growth of milk production is infectious disease. Disease 
management is crucial to preserving food security and profits for the public and private markets 
respectively. When food security is secured, both the society and economy benefits.  
Johne’s Disease (JD) is a contagious, chronic, incurable enteric, and often fatal infection 
that primarily affects the small intestines of ruminants (Garcia and Shalloo, 2015). In 2007, an 
estimated 68% of dairy herds in the US had at least 1 cow with JD (Corbett et al., 2018). Because 
of the widespread prevalence there is a range of impacts on certain populations and regions 
(Espejo, Godden, Hartmann, and Wells, 2012). The chronic enteritis in ruminants is caused by 
Mycobacterium avium subspecies Paratuberculosis (MAP) (Garcia and Shalloo, 2015). The 
main impact of JD in the dairy sector is economic losses directly associated with premature 
culling, as well as reduced milk production (Raizman et al., 2007). Milk production from dairy 
cows affected with Johne’s disease has been estimated to drop by 590 kg in the third lactation 
and up to 1,270 kg in the fourth lactation (Alberta Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, 2015). 
JD also negatively affects the well-being of cattle; as JD progresses, it slowly causes weight loss 
and eventual death. Currently, practical treatment is not available (Espejo, Godden, Hartmann, 
and Wells, 2012). Ignoring the disease is not a viable long-term strategy. Beyond the economic 
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and animal welfare effects, there are some suggestions that JD may contribute to human health 
issues (Feller et al., 2007). The organism that causes Johne's disease is not currently known to 
cause disease in humans, but it has been detected in humans with Crohn's disease, as have 
numerous other bacteria and viruses. This call for effective risk mitigation strategies.  
Existing disease management strategies currently in practice include cull-and-kill, best-
management practices (e.g. separation of heifers from calf), vaccinations, and disease testing 
kits, or a combination. Current vaccines for Johne’s disease have been shown to give false 
positive results for tuberculosis (TB), caused by the pathogens Mycobacterium tuberculosis (M. 
TB the human variant) and Mycobacterium bovis (M. bovis, the bovine variant). Humans can 
contract TB from raw milk contaminated with M.bovis.  TB is one of the deadliest diseases 
facing mankind. In a report published by The World Health Organization, an estimated 1.8 
billion people—one quarter of the world's population—are currently infected with the bacteria 
that causes TB and 10 million people fell ill from TB and 1.6 million died last year (2019).  
Most domestic food safety systems and international trade regimes have measures in 
place to address risks related to TB in live cattle and meat products. The most common test is the 
enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay, also called ELISA, which detects and measures antibodies 
in the blood. When an animal is vaccinated using current vaccines for JD, some ELISA tests 
trigger a positive test result for TB because of the similar antibodies. A positive TB test triggered 
due to the presence of JD vaccine markers is known as a false positive. When positive results are 
triggered, either due to the presence of the disease or due to false-positives, governments 
quarantine the suspected product. Often this involves quarantine of infected farms, extermination 
of the animals, extended cease production orders for infected farms, and withdrawals and 
destruction of any suspected contaminated products from the market. The results are a loss of 
profit, food insecurity, and other negative trade implications such as border closures. Any new 
vaccine will need to effectively handle this risk. 
This thesis begins with a discussion of the nutrition and safety challenges facing policy 
makers.  The discussion will touch on the need for nutritious, safe, and secure food, and the 
evidence of the links between JD and decreased milk production. Following this review, I will 
illustrate the national and international mechanisms and methods used to control JD. The thesis 
uses the theory of common pool goods to examine the policy challenges of developing vaccines. 
This will lead to an analysis and explanation of a range of potential policy scenarios that will be 
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used to establish the conditions for a best-case scenario for all actors (government, the general 
public, vaccine producers, and milk producers). This best-case scenario is used to discuss policy 
options. Regardless of the technical aspects of the strategy chosen, there is need for effective 
communication and education of vaccine end users on vaccine and DIVA test producers, 
involving veterinarians, the government, and marketing agents/companies. The thesis ends with a 
concluding chapter.  
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Section 2: 
Background  
 
 
Globally, the bovine dairy sector is one of the most widely distributed and valuable 
sources of agricultural commodities, with production of 770 billion litres of milk valued at 328 
billion USD in 2013 (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 2014). The 
market is projected to grow by 177 million tonnes by 2025 (Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations 2014). Milk production is a key component of any food security strategy 
as milk contains energy, protein, and vital micronutrients (Westenhöfer, 2013). As of 2016 
statistics, dairy manufacturing shipments from Canada totaled C$15.2 billion, with a dairy cattle 
population of 1.4 million head (Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 2018). One potential 
constraint on that growth is disease infestation. 
Johne’s Disease and TB are found in ruminants that produce milk. If a bovine ruminant 
contracts JD, milk production is reduced (Alberta Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, 2015), 
and the health of the animal is compromised. Given the overall importance of milk in our global 
diet, these effects jeopardize food security.  
JD is contracted when ruminants consume feed and water contaminated with manure 
from infected animals. The disease is not immediately detectable by the current tests. The disease 
becomes apparent when shedding and diarrhea is observed. Viral shedding refers to the 
expulsion and release of virus progeny following successful reproduction during a host-cell 
infection. Once replication has been completed and the host is exhausted of all resources in 
making viral progeny, the viruses may begin to leave (Donat et al., 2014). In the case of 
ruminants, the virus is expelled in body excretions, both from the nose and mouth and digestive 
tract.  
 
 2.1: Stages of Johne’s Disease  
Figure 2.1 shows an illustration of the protracted nature in terms of the number of stages 
before clinical signs of Johne’s disease visibly manifest in the animal. Animals can get infected as 
early as a few months after birth, while clinical signs only show at a later stage – between 2 to 6 
years of age (Hendrick and Douma, 2006). According to Chiodini et al. (1984) and Sockett et al. 
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(1992, p.152), clinical signs are contingent on ‘age at infection’ and ‘dosage of the organism’. 
Given the time lag between infection and display of clinical signs, cattle infected at a mature age 
would have a low chance of showing clinical signs before the animal is culled (Whitlock and 
Buergelt, 1996). 
 
 
Figure 2.0.1: Stage by stage protracted timeline of a bovine infected with Johne’s disease 
Source: http://www.beefresearch.ca/research-topic.cfm/johnes-disease-51 
 
In essence, by the time infection in the animal is identified and confirmed, the carrier 
animal would have had multiple opportunities to spread the disease to other vulnerable animals 
within the herd. Although diagnostic tests are currently available, they have proven to be less 
reliable and effective in detecting the presence of infected animals until they reach a stage of 
super shedding. Efforts to eliminate Johne’s disease using “test-and-cull” methods have proven 
to be unsuccessful (UK House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, 
2013).  
JD is an endemic disease, meaning that it affects certain populations and regions (Roth 
2011). As noted earlier, the number of confirmed cases of JD has been irregular. In 2005, there 
were 1227 cases of JD globally (Sibley and Orpin, 2016). In 2013 and 2016 there have been 
5086 and 526 cases respectively (Sibley and Orpin, 2016). This variability is attributed to 
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inadequate surveillance. Generally adequate and effective methods of disease control adopted 
over the years have controlled the disease in many nations, with sporadic events which can 
spread and contaminate widely. 
Nevertheless, JD remains endemic in the global cattle population. Over the past decade 
all regions of the world have reported at least one case (table 2.1). While the data suggests the 
disease is most prevalent and widespread in Europe, this is at least partly due to the active 
surveillance program undertaken there.  
 
Table 2.1: Regional prevalence of JD (Jan. 2005 – June 2016) 
Region Confirmed cases 
JD 
Africa 119 
North America 604 
South America 201 
Asia 6,351 
Europe 27,170 
Oceania 3 
Total 34,448 
http://www.oie.int/wahis_2/public/wahid.php/Diseaseinformation/statusdetail 
 
 There are several regional hotspots, with a mix of developing countries (both food 
importers and exporters) and a number of highly developed nations.  
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Table 2.2: Regional hotspots for JD, 2005-2016 
  
 
Country (Figures in bracket are number of confirmed cases) 
Africa JD South Africa (75); Libya (31); Kenya (3); Lesotho (3) 
North America JD Mexico (583); Cuba (11) 
 South America JD Colombia (103); Ecuador (39); Chile (18); Peru (18) 
Asia JD Japan (4,583); Korean Rep. (1,370); Iran (599); Israel (88); 
Palestinian (58); Thailand (58) 
Europe JD U.K (16,099); Germany (4,583); Spain (4,122); Hungary (356); 
Austria (331) 
 Oceania JD New Caledonia (3) 
http://www.oie.int/wahis_2/public/wahid.php/Diseaseinformation/statusdetail 
 
 There is limited statistical and empirical evidence on true prevalence and economic losses 
associated with JD because of no effective diagnostic test reliably detects the infections because 
development is slow (Alberta Agriculture and Forestry, Livestock and Crops Division 2015; 
McKenna, et al. 2006). Serum ELISA and fecal culture tests are the most frequently adopted 
methods to detect JD, and to estimate prevalence. ELISA is rapid, low-cost ($12/head), but low 
sensitivity test for Johne’s disease (Dufour, et al., 2004; Bastida and Juste, 2011). Fecal culture 
testing offers a more specific result, but it is slower and more expensive ($37/head) compared with 
ELISA. Most of the reported studies used ELISA, a few used fecal culture, and one or two used 
both. The United States Department of Agriculture reported in 2017 the range of options and risks 
of missing infected animals (table 2.3). 
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Table 2.3: Johne’s disease testing options and the risk of buying cattle  
Options Risk 
No testing. Very risky—>5% percent chance, for each 
purchased animal of being infected with M. 
paratuberculosis 
ELISA-test the individual animal before 
purchase; do not purchase anything from herds 
with cows positive by ELISA  
Slightly less risky than not testing; more 
confidence in negative tests on older 
animals than heifers  
Quarantine and test after purchase: ELISA + 
culture twice at 6-month intervals  
Lowers risk and is sound policy for several 
infectious diseases of cattle  
Partial test on herd of origin: ELISA on 30 2nd 
lactation or older cows  
Low risk of Johne’s disease in any animal 
from such herds but not 0%  
Whole-herd ELISA or fecal culture on the herd 
of origin.  
Very low risk of Johne’s disease if herd 
tests 100% ELISA-negative or culture-
negative  
Purchase only from test-negative status herds 
(level 2 or higher) 
Lowest possible risk for purchase of M. 
paratuberculosis-infected herd 
replacements  
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animalhealth/nvap/NVAP-Reference-
Guide/Control-and-Eradication/Johnes-Disease  
 
Overall, the estimated JD prevalence is believed to be increasing over time (Kennedy, et 
al., 2016). This increasing trend of JD prevalence can be also observed from the prevalence 
applied in previous studies. Specifically, in the 1980s and early 1990s the lowest estimated 
prevalence was below 1% but rose above 5% in almost all countries after 2000. The details of 
prevalence estimation can be found in table 2.4. 
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Table 2.4: Estimated prevalence  
 Study Country Year of study Prevalence 
Within-
herd-
prevalence 
(WHP) 
Scott-Orr et al. AUS 1988 0.1% 
Lombard et al. US 2005 3.8% 
Raizman et al. US 2007 8% 
Tiwari et al. CA 2008 12.7% 
Donat et al. Germany 2014 1.4%-54% 
Barkema et al. CA 2015 20%1 
Kennedy et al. Ireland 2016 7.4% 
Meyer and Hall Netherlands 1994 6.2% 
Sample 
prevalence 
VanLeeuwen et al. CA 2000 10% 
Johnson et al. US 2001 41.8% 
O’Doherty et al. EU 2002 7%-55% 
Mee and Richardson Ireland 2008 3% 
    
Source: Zhaoxue and Hall, 2017 Literature Review on Economic Impact of Johne’s Disease and 
its Control Options in Canada working paper 
 
Prevalence reported by existing studies in Table 2.4 is too variable to conclude any 
estimate of overall JD prevalence worldwide or in a specific region. Many articles have 
mentioned that accurate prevalence was not available, and it is difficult to estimate (Caldow and 
Henderson 2002; Caldow, Low, and Gunn, 2003; and Constable et al., 2017) due to limitations in 
diagnosis methods and the insidious nature of JD (Whittington and Sergeant, 2001; Caldow and 
Henderson, 2002). 
Based on the 2007 Dairy NAHMS study, about 68 percent of U.S. dairy herds have at 
least one cow that tests positive for Johne’s, with herd prevalence approaching 100% in large 
dairy herds (United States Department of Agriculture, 2017). There is limited evidence of 
incidence in Canada. Figures from 2001 indicate that 16.1% of 984 cows from New Brunswick, 
Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland were found to be infected with JD 
(McKenna, et al., 2004.)  
Bovine JD can easily be spread internationally (and probably is) because global imports 
and exports of dairy have been increasing, particularly in India, Australia, Brazil, New Zealand, 
                                                          
1 Within herd prevalence in Western Canada and Ontario added up to 20%. Eastern Canada prevalence equaled 
12%, and Quebec 5%.  
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Uruguay, the EU, Mexico, Argentina, the United States, and Canada (“Tuberculosis”, 2019). To 
this end, the industry and many governments have targeted to improve JD control.  
 
 2.2: Controlling ruminant diseases 
Controlling disease means controlling the risk associated with the disease. Risk 
assessment has four tenants: hazard identification; hazard characterization; exposure assessment, 
and; risk characterization (Phillips, 2009). Hazards can be biological, chemical, and physical 
agents that can cause negative effects (Phillips, 2009). Hazard identification occurs when one 
observes a biological, chemical, or physical agent causing a negative impact (Phillips, 2009). 
Hazard characterization is the act of collecting data on, analyzing, and describing the relationship 
between the agent and the adverse response in order to determine the dosage required for specific 
responses (Phillips, 2009). Exposure assessment is the act of measuring what exposures are 
anticipated or experienced under varying conditions (Phillips, 2009). Finally, risk 
characterization involves assessing whether an adverse effect will occur and thresholds for 
impact.  
The challenge is that currently JD is a non-reportable disease meaning when 
contamination is found, it is not a legal requirement to report it to the government. JD being non-
reportable means that the disease is usually controlled by the producers. JD is only found when 
the bovine is wasting and showing symptoms of sickness (Cetinkaya et. al., 1997). At this point, 
a veterinarian is contacted, and tests are conducted to determine the cause of the symptoms. 
Once it is determined the disease is indeed JD, the farmer will usually cull and kill the animal 
and other infected animals on the farm, especially any progeny that suckled. 
Internationally, there are risks associated with presenting an infected animal for export. 
Some countries, such as France and Germany, and some segments of the industry will test for 
JD. When a disease is found by importers, there is cause for alert as a disease has entered another 
country. The country notifies the appropriate governments of the disease.  
JD is being managed by a range of approaches: doing nothing, which leads to the 
maximum economic loss and threats to food security; best-management practices, which often 
involves government regulators; cull-and-kill, which is a process that the dairy producers 
themselves can manage; vaccination and testing innovations, which involves vaccine producers, 
institutions such as universities that do research on vaccines, dairy producers, and government 
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regulators (as vaccines require regulatory approval); and, finally, a combination of best 
management practices, selected vaccination, aggressive testing, and cull-and-kill, to manage 
outbreaks.  
There are various methods of controlling JD. One such method is test-and cull. One US 
study showed that this method is profitable if paratuberculosis has a higher prevalence than 5% 
(Collins and Morgan, 1991). While it is good health practice to cull and kill the infected herd, it 
is also important to note that mid-size U.S. commercial dairy farms often choose to retain cows 
in early infection stages to sustain milk production and farm income (Dorshorst, Collins, and 
Lomard, 2006). Management based practices have been shown to be a fast way to reduce JD 
infection rate in US dairy herds, as well as being more cost-effective (Pillars, Bolton and Grooms 
2011). 
Canada currently is aligned with the best management approach. The Canadian Johne’s 
Disease Initiative, implemented in 2013, is funded by Diary Farmers of Canada and the Canadian 
Cattlemen’s Association (Baker and Empringham 2013). The goal of this program is to increase 
awareness and educate producers and veterinarians, encourage the development and 
implementation of control programs in the 10 provinces, and facilitate and fund research 
programs on JD. One concern is that smaller and lower-budget producers were not likely to 
implement best JD management practices due to high cost (Kelton et al 2016). Overall, there is a 
lack of national urgency for a program, however there is still a voluntary JD program for 
reporting until funds are depleted (Baker and Empringham 2013). 
Surveillance and reporting are core to disease management. The Canadian Food 
Inspection Agency (CFIA), the competent federal regulatory authority, and provincial veterinary 
authorities manage the identification of diseases. CFIA definitions of ‘notifiable’ or ‘reportable’ 
diseases are clearest while definitions at the provincial level can be less clear. Section 5(2) of the 
Canada Health of Animals Act requires any veterinarian who has any suspicion of the existence 
of reportable disease in Canada to immediately report such suspicion to a veterinary inspector.2 
Currently 31 diseases are immediately reportable in Canada, including foot and mouth disease, 
scrapie, trichinellosis, anthrax, Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) and bovine TB, and a few rare 
indigenous diseases. A second category are those diseases that are immediately notifiable; these 
include mostly exotic diseases not normally found in Canada for which there are no control or 
                                                          
2 https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/H-3.3/page-2.html#h-4  
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eradication programs. The CFIA may undertake control measures for such diseases when 
notified of their presence in Canada. More than 40 animal diseases are immediately notifiable in 
Canada. JD falls into a third category of annually notifiable diseases, which are those diseases 
for which Canada must submit an annual report to the World Organisation for Animal Health 
(OIE) indicating their presence within Canada. In general, they are diseases that are present in 
Canada and are of concern to our trading partners but are not classified as reportable or 
immediately notifiable (Government of Canada, Canadian Food Inspection Agency and Animal 
Health Directorate 2018).  
In the current bovine trade regime, there are regulations to test imported cattle to see if 
they are infected with pathogens that can be transmitted to humans through consumption or 
handling. The current method that is employed by the majority of the border agencies 
responsible for testing animals, particularly cattle, is to first test a sample with the scratch-test 
method. If the test comes out positive (either due to detecting the disease or as a false-positive), 
the cattle are then culled, killed, and disposed. This results in increasing costs for sellers of the 
cattle, and a cost for those who pay for the disposal - the government of Canada. 
Existing JD vaccines do not reduce the instances of the aforementioned costs. When 
vaccinated cattle are tested, they often test positive (albeit as a false positive) but are still 
destroyed because it is impossible to definitively determine a diseased animal cost-effectively. 
Any economic benefit the vaccine seller might hope to gain is jeopardized by this anomaly. 
Since current tests for diseases leads to false-positive of TB, producers under-vaccinate.  
There are many pathways for vaccines to become commercially available. One common 
approach is for the creator to file for a patent and then sell the asset to other established vaccine 
producers. Alternatively, some developers patent and then exploit the technology through a start-
up or expansion in house or through a start-up.  The risks and returns vary depending on the 
strategy pursued.  
This study is less focused on that choice and more about policy strategy, so the focus is 
on regulatory and politics around food security.  
If standards for the regulation of vaccinations vary between trading countries, then there 
could be negative implications in trade, as well as high control costs for importing countries 
(Seitzinger, Forsythe and Madell, 1999). When regulations are not standardized, there can be 
information gap between trading countries. Country A utilizes system z, which is not understood 
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by country B, and therefore results in country B misunderstanding the vaccine used by country 
A, which might trigger a trade disruption.    
Many international governing bodies investigate disease control, including as the World 
Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) (Weber-Vintzel 2010). At this point, Canada is attempting 
to manage JD and TB together because of their linkages. Genome Canada is investigating the 
possible ways to manage JD and TB using vaccination. The sciences are progressing and there 
appears to be an appetite for the technology but getting to a successful product launch will 
require navigating the regulatory system. 
For the OIE to certify a diagnostic kit, which includes diagnostic assays and vaccines, it 
must be prove its “fitness for purpose” (World Organization for Animal Health). The applicant 
first submits an application form for registration of a diagnostic kit to the OIE, with the fee. The 
applicant is advised to coordinate with the OIE Secretariat for Registration of Diagnostic Kits 
(OIESRDK), which will: provide procedural guidance during the pre-submission phase; monitor 
regularly declarations and preliminary appraisals of compatibility of the interests declared by the 
individuals concerned; and, coordinate the acceptability of the application submitted. The 
OIESRDK may ask for additional data, clarification, or other information. 
Once the information has been accepted, a chairperson, specialist, and reviewers are 
assigned by the OIE. A timetable is proposed for evaluation by this group. If the information 
provided is insufficient, the OIE informs the applicant that the application has not been accepted 
and a refund is issued, less 15% for administration costs incurred.  
An accepted application results in the appointment of the chairperson of the review panel 
(CRP). These individuals are chosen from the OIE Reference Centres or from amongst other 
internationally renowned experts. The CRP works with the applicant to clarify all technical 
matters.  
Once the CRP is satisfied with the information provided by the applicant, the CRP 
submits a final assessment report through the OIESRDK to the Members of the Special 
Commission. The Special Commission discusses the final assessment report and either adopts or 
rejects the application.  
The final submission is sent to the OIE Director General, who informs the applicant of 
the Special Commission’s opinion. In the case of a favourable opinion, the Director General 
informs the applicant that the diagnostic kit will be proposed for inclusion in the register by vote 
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of the World Assembly of Delegates at the next General Session (this is possible at the latest 3 
months before the General Session held every year in May).  
At the General Session, the World Assembly of Delegates votes on a resolution for 
inclusion of the diagnostic kit(s) in the register. Within 14 days of the favourable vote of the 
World Assembly of Delegate, the OIE Register of Diagnostic Kits is updated. 
Finally, mock-ups or specimens of the final outer and inner packages with labelling must 
be submitted to the OIE.  
Overall, this is quite an extended process, so it is important to anticipate and plan the 
diagnostic as part of any vaccine development program. 
To start that analysis, the section below discusses the current regulatory processes for 
introducing a new vaccine in key markets. 
 
 2.3: North American regulations 
Because the US is the single largest dairy export market for Canada, it is appropriate to 
start with the North American regulatory system (McKenna, et al. 2004). Canada and the US are 
close trading partners and becoming closer because of the Canada – United States – Mexico 
Agreement (CUSMA), which will allow for more dairy products to be imported into the hitherto 
subsidized Canadian market (Foreign Affairs Trade and Development Canada, Information 
Technology, & Corporate Procurement 2018). A new vaccine could be particularly useful as all 
three countries have endemic JD; a vaccine would yield significant benefits in Canada, the 
United States and Mexico as Johne ’s disease is prevalent throughout the region. A recent 
outbreak in Alberta highlights the risk of not acting proactively to manage any disease (Bell, 
2018).  
In Canada the Health of Animals Act and Regulations governs the regulation of 
veterinary biologics in Canada, which authorizes the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food to 
regulate the manufacturing, importation and sale of animal vaccines. The Canadian Centre for 
Veterinary Biologics (CCVB) of the Terrestrial Animal Health Division, Animal Health 
Directorate, and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency have been delegated with regulating the 
testing, importation, and distribution and sale of vaccines. It will be important to consult and 
liaise with these organizations when thinking about producing vaccines for animals. These 
organizations review, approve, and inspect facilities related to the production of vaccinations to 
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be used and sold in Canada, and exportation of these vaccines. The licensing requirements are 
described in the regulations and in guidelines, which are available from the Canadian Centre for 
Veterinary Biologics.3  
Globally, vaccines are evaluated on a case-by-case basis and are licensed based on 
fulfilment of four criteria: purity, potency, safety and efficacy. While efficacy shows the 
protective effect (immunogenicity) of a vaccine, potency is demonstrated by having each batch 
of the vaccine produced provide the same level of protection as the original vaccine (Draayer, 
2011). The onus to prove that these requirements are met is on the manufacturer. “A risk-based 
approach is used to evaluate the safety of the product in target and non-target species, humans 
and the environment. Other federal departments, such as Health Canada or the Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans are consulted during the risk and environmental assessments, when human 
health issues or national fish health concerns are involved. In many respects, the Canadian 
licensing requirements are like the United States Department of Agriculture requirements for 
veterinary biologics. Documents prepared by using the United States Code of Federal 
Regulations (9 CFR) protocols and test procedures or equivalent are accepted by the CCVB for 
review and licensing purposes. 
Manufacturers and researchers intending to license experimental vaccines are encouraged 
to consult with the CCVB early in the product development process, so that the research data and 
quality assurance documentation are consistent with Canadian regulatory requirements, as 
specified in the Health of Animals Act and Regulations. 
In addition to conforming to the Health of Animals Act and Regulations, all research and 
development projects must meet the standards and requirements for laboratory biosafety and 
animal care described in the current edition of the Health Canada Laboratory Biosafety 
Guidelines, and the Canadian Council on Animal Care Guide to the Care and Use of 
Experimental Animals. 
Recently, regulations have been implemented to recover fees for some of the veterinary 
biologics regulatory services including issuance of permits, licenses and inspection of facilities. 
The cost recovery schedule for veterinary biologics is outlined in the Health of Animals Act and 
Regulations and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency Fees Notice, Part 11 - Services Related to 
                                                          
3 http://www.inspection.gc.ca/animals/veterinary-biologics/guidelines-forms/4-
5e/eng/1318508906578/1318509047147 
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Veterinary Biologics (Items 40-50). Service standards (response times) have been established for 
these regulatory services and are available from CCVB.”  
The United States’ vaccine regulations are like Canada’s in the sense that there is much 
regulatory forethought, as well as a significant role for the private market. In the United States, 
regulation of vaccines for dairy herds is established and implemented by the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA). The USDA creates regulations on a case-by-case basis, 
which is a process that may take 6 years or longer (Smyth, McDonald, Falck-Zepeda, 2014). 
 The United States is a large market to access for vaccination products. On average, the 
US produces 19,932 lbs of milk per cow in its lifetime (The United States Department of 
Agriculture, 2016). In the United States, newly acquired small herds (30-99 cows) had an overall 
testing rate of 74%, while medium sized herds (100-499 cows) has a testing rate of around 42%, 
and large herds (500 plus) had a testing rate of 50% (Ochieng, and Hobbs, 2016). The USDA 
utilizes the internet to disseminate information to increase participation by ensuring that these 
producers have access to internet services. The issue with JD control in the United States is that 
veterinary services are not always available in proximity to where livestock operations are 
located (Ochieng, and Hobbs, 2016).  
Understanding that the vaccine induced antibody interferes with serologic surveillance 
and epidemiology of Johne’s-disease-infected animals has led to a policy of utilizing the 
Differentiating Infection in Vaccinated Animals (DIVA) tests that are sensitive to the markers 
caused by vaccines (Lee, Senne, and Suarez, 2004). Utilizing this method of DIVA allows for 
economic loss to be contained, as well as better management of the risk of spreading the disease. 
DIVA can also be seen as a quality control mechanism as it ensures that infected animals do not 
pass through the borders. 
 
2.4: International Regulatory Framework for Animal Disease Control and Use of Vaccines  
To control diseases, producers of vaccines and the like need national approval and 
international recognition. The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) provides regulations 
concerning animal vaccines, vaccination and other measures aimed at reducing the risks 
associated with animal diseases (Garland, and de Clercq, 2011). Although international standards 
have led to marked decreases in risk of contamination and spread of disease, there is no way to 
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attain zero risk, and therefore, minimizing risk is the best policy makers can hope to achieve 
through the methods described in this study.  
 Bilateral agreements between nations allow for information on the validity of risk of new 
technology to flow in real time, which should improve confidence levels of both importing and 
exporting countries (Sutmoller, and Olascoaga, 2013). While the bilateral, multilateral, and 
trilateral trade agreements are important, the OIE and expert committees of the importing and 
exporting nations are key to gaining market confidence in new technologies (Garland, and de 
Clercq, 2011). Core to this is a need for transparent documentation of the animal health situation, 
including factors required to assess the risks involved (Garland, and de Clercq, 2011).  
OIE animal health standards are implemented to facilitate relatively risk-free and safe 
trade in livestock and livestock products. Listed in these standards are transboundary animal 
diseases that are at risk of being transported from one trading partner to another. These standards 
draw on the norms of international trade and negotiations (Thomson et al., 2004; Milstien, 
Kaddar and Kieny 2006). One such standard imparted by the OIE is to remove regularly-infected 
parts of bovines, such as the bones and lymph nodes, for safety purposes. This is something that 
has been normalized internationally. However, when risk mitigation strategies are difficult or 
impossible (e.g. when infected animal parts are not removable), then vaccines, vaccine marker 
tests like DIVA and enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays (ELISA), and sound facility 
management in the supply chain are needed to safeguard against transboundary movement of 
disease and any related disruption. Such DIVA control strategies were utilized to control avian 
influenza infections in poultry (Capua, Terregino, Cattoli, Mutinelli, Rodriquez, 2002).  
Other nation states, such as the European Union, are important. In the United Kingdom, 
studies have shown that ELISA tests used to detect antibodies to differentiate vaccinated from 
infected animals has led to positive economic impacts by allowing for trade to remain open 
(Mackay, et al. 1998). If there was no system implemented to differentiate between vaccinated 
and infected animals, country or regional-level restrictions would jeopardize free trade. With the 
differentiation, international barriers to trade and externalities stemming from new vaccines are 
kept at a minimum.  
Specifically related to JD, the United Kingdom has implemented a National Johne’s 
Disease Management Plan, which aims to have at least 80% dairy farmers enrolled (UK House 
of Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, 2013). This goal is anticipated to 
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be reached due to the recruitment of the 23 milk purchasers’ organizations, large dairy herds, and 
registration of new companies. However, the success of control programs varies depending on 
eagerness to implement robust controls, especially at the farm level (Sibley and Orpin, 2016). 
Canadian dairy products have not typically been exported to the UK (Government of 
Canada Canadian Dairy Information Centre 2018). Instead the UK is a competitor to Canada as 
they export to countries we export to, such as the Philippines (Government of Canada Canadian 
Dairy Information Centre 2018). If the UK were to lower the levels of false-positives, their 
exports would likely grow at the expense of Canadian dairy exports.  
Meanwhile, France has farmer organizations, called Groupement De Defense Sanitaire 
(GDS), that support farmers in controlling animal diseases, with specific actions on Johne’s 
Disease. France also utilizes a National Control Plan implemented in 2000 to run fecal diagnostic 
tests on herds, followed by individual tests, early culling, and incentives for testing (Liu et al., 
2003). Although only 3% of herds are enrolled in this program, it is the complementary National 
Certification Program established in 2002 that runs ELISA tests as part of regional herd 
screening that makes France able to respond to JD. Information on the dangers of not testing and 
incentives are offered to farmers (Garrido et al., 2013).  
Germany’s federal legislature regulates infectious diseases through the veterinary 
authority; however, JD is a low priority. The National reference lab licenses tests and publishes 
an official manual of approved tests and specialist counselling for veterinary authorities at the 
regional level. In 2014 the Ministry of Food and Agriculture recommended national hygiene 
implementation for ruminants, though only seven states in Germany used these recommendations 
(Weber-Vintzel, 2010). The process recommended to first sample the environment semi-
annually, followed by annual serological testing and removal of sero-positive animals, and 
finally, annual bacteriological testing and removal of the positive test cases. Although Germany 
is a member of the European Union, it has little insight in implementing European Union 
legislature (Kelton et al, 2016), perhaps because the highest within-herd prevalence of JD, in the 
state of Thuringia, is only 9.6% (Donat et al., 2014). Canada exports very few dairy products to 
Germany (Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada 2018) and is neither an importer nor competitor in 
third markets.   
Countries, producers of vaccines and dairy, the public, and various non-profit 
organizations have a stake in preserving food security. There have been many improvements to 
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regulatory practices following the innovation of vaccines; however, vaccines alone do not curb 
risk in transmittable diseases. In addition to vaccine implementation, disease surveillance, 
biosecurity at the farm level, traceability and control of the source cattle and slaughterhouse 
inspections are quintessential to risk management (Garland and de Clercq, 2011).  
The diversity of approaches, and the fact that food security is a shared problem, make the 
common pool goods theory particularly useful. The theory of common pool goods is discussed 
next.  
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Section 3:  
Conceptual Framework 
 
 
The feasibility of potential policy options is considered in this section. This method will 
illuminate each institution’s ability to implement changes and develop policy. At root, the 
challenge is to know the nature of the goods that will be delivered through a range of strategies 
and the incentives or disincentives that will affect their provision.  This will help to unpack the 
intricacies of this problem and to determine which actors in this complicated space may be able 
to effect meaningful change that reduces the incidence of JD and false positives triggering TB 
and helps to obtain global food security. 
I apply the theories from Ostrom’s common pool good and Institutional Analysis and 
Development Framework theories, which have historically been applied to water allocation 
rights (2005, 2006), and Mahoney’s vertical contracting, which has historically been applied to 
economic transaction costs (1992). This thesis uses these theories in a different manner to 
explain the possible solutions to JD false-positives, disease management, and food security.  
  
 3.1: Feasibility 
Changing the testing and vaccination regime in a country is a public policy issue. Public 
policy issues can only be implemented if they are feasible. The feasibility of the political 
landscape is an important part of the discussion of a change in practices within any regime.  
 According to Majone (1975, pp 259) political feasibility can be considered as “the 
limitation of the available political resources; those relating to the permissible distribution of the 
benefits and costs of policy (distributional constraints); and those imposed by the institutional 
framework.”  
 First, the policy to be implemented cannot be exclusionary and disproportionate – that is 
to say, the cost should not rest solely on one actor to deliver best management regimes or disease 
control. If the costs rest solely on the producers, there could be endless litigation, or they might 
simply refuse to adopt the approach; ultimately such a solution would be ineffective (Majone 
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1975). Therefore, it is essential to find a solution that has costs fairly distributed among all actors 
involved.  
 Secondly, for a policy to be politically feasible, the institutions involved and motivated 
by the solution must be capable of implementing the necessary changes. Policy makers are the 
cornerstone of most systems and hold much power, usually being able to decide categorically 
whether a policy change is adopted or considered (Majone, 1975). Institutions, however, also 
need to be equipped to implement decisions; this requires appropriate power, capacity and access 
to appropriate resources. These resources include time, finances, and the free-will to explore 
additional options.  
 Success of a program relies on many connections between various actors and institutions. 
When any new strategy is proposed, there is usually a gap between the intent of policy makers 
and the interests of end users. In the context of animal diseases, it is up to the producers to ensure 
there is communication between the government, policy makers, and consumers that will allow 
for the successful implementation of a new safety strategy. This institutional constraint points in 
the direction of the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework as a way to unpack the 
decision and implementation spaces that will need to function to deliver better policy outcomes.   
  
 3.2: Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework  
Examining the institutions and analyzing their ability to provide solutions to common 
pool good problems is best accomplished with some conceptual structure. Ostrom’s institutional 
analysis and development (IAD) framework offers an accessible and tested analytical tool 
(Ostrom, 2005). The IAD framework offers a conventional input-activity-output framing, 
focusing on actors, institutions and problems. At its most basic level, the IAD framework 
consists of three elements: 1) exogenous variables; 2) an action arena; and 3) the interactions that 
generate outputs and outcomes (Ostrom, 2005). Ostrom defines exogenous variables to include 
biophysical or material conditions (e.g. the physical and biological constraints and challenges in 
different growing regions), attributes of community (e.g. the industrial structure and political 
systems governing agriculture) and rules (e.g. the overarching legal and institutional norms and 
practices that delimit choices) (2005). The action arena is composed of action situations and 
participants – variously defining problems, issues, policy areas and networks or communities of 
individuals and organisations.  
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Figure 3.1: Components of the IAD Framework 
 
Source: Ostrom 2005, pp. 15. 
 
In this case, the outcomes are a range of strategies for managing the risk of JD, including 
the cull and kill method, vaccination with improved diagnostics, and a range of regulatory 
responses.  Each of these choices would entail a different risk profile for the market and 
consumers, such that the outputs would be a conceptually differentiated set of attributes.  This 
opens an opportunity to help frame the strategies in the context of a typology of goods in food 
markets. 
  
 3.3: Common Pool Goods from regulatory processes 
There are a range of goods defined by theory.  One configuration is the classical search- 
experience-credence framing, where consumers can know everything they need to know for 
search goods, but can only fully appreciate an experience good by consuming the product and 
may never independently determine the full array of benefits of a credence good, as many of its 
impacts may be subtle and only determined over a long period.  All search and many experience 
goods can be delivered efficiently through the marketplace as private goods, but markets fail to 
produce the optimal amounts of some experience goods and all credence goods. Food borne 
disease converts animals and meat, which otherwise might be search or experience goods, into 
credence goods. Different market structures are needed to more effectively manage products 
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with these attributes. Some health measures are pure public goods, in that everyone benefits 
equally, but JD is more localized in the parts of the global food system and affects different 
consumers differently, which makes it more of a common-pool type of good.  
The definition of a common pool good is any good that is a shared resource between a 
group of people (Hess and Ostrom, 2006). Maintaining food security is a concern for the broader 
public, but the interests and benefits are not universally distributed, making both pure public 
provision or pure private market less effective mechanisms for delivery. Governments have 
different interests based on whether they are governing food exporting or importing countries, 
the global supply chain is differentially affected by disease and has widely different capacity to 
manage disease when it emerges, and consumers have differential interests, depending on their 
diets.    
In the context of JD management, there are four main actors: vaccine developers and 
manufacturers who seek to gain from the production and sale of vaccines; the general public that 
seeks safe, nutritious and affordable food; dairy farmers who manage the herds where infection 
would occur, incur many of the costs of lost production and will have to pay for many of the 
remedies to manage JD; and governments because they have a broader set of objectives, 
including food safety and security, industrial competitiveness and international market access. 
Table 3.1 illustrates the differences between the various goods, based on the degree of 
excludability and rivalry.  Excludability is defined by whether others can be excluded from the 
benefits of a good. For example, your household furniture is perfectly excludable, as long as you 
lock your doors to others, while clean air is shared by all.  Rivalry is defined as the impact of 
others consumption on your benefits: shoes are perfectly rival, in that only one person can wear a 
pair at any time, while public health (as in the freedom from infectious disease) benefits 
everyone equally. The state is the only effective agent for delivering pure public goods (those 
that are non-rival and non-excludable) and markets are the most efficient and effective means of 
delivering private or market goods (those that are rival and perfectly excludable), but many 
goods fall in the middle, with a range of non-state, non-market solutions available.  Public goods 
are goods such as knowledge since there is no way to exclude individuals from knowledge and 
having one person have the knowledge will have no bearing on the amount of knowledge 
available to another individual. Purely private goods, such as clothes and pens, are goods that 
will be excludable from others and utility is subtracted from the total units available to others 
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when that good is used. Toll or club goods involve goods that exhibit low rivalry but are 
excludable, can be produced: day-cares or country clubs are examples.  
The problem of managing animal diseases, like JD, is best categorized in the common 
pool good category because if the herd is vaccinated with the appropriate vaccine, that herd is 
excluded from infection, but may cause market disruptions if the vaccinated animals are 
presented for trade and testing delivers false-positives. The vaccinated herd is also subtracted 
from the total number of infected animals. The infected herd, in contrast, is also totally 
subtracted from the total pool of tradable goods. Although this is not a perfect fit, it is the closest 
that can be hypothesized. 
 
Table 3.1 Types of Goods 
 Rivalry 
 
Excludability  
 Low High 
Difficult Public Goods Common-pool resources 
Easy Toll/Club Goods Private Goods 
 
Mahoney (1992) posits that different organizational structures operate depending on the 
nature of a good.   When assessing the risk of a product and the assignment of property rights to 
the good, which are regulated both by government bodies and market functions, simply utilizing 
property ownership and negotiation tactics to assign responsibility is often an inadequate policy 
option. Mahoney (1992) asserts that vertical contracting, whereby a commodity has actors 
ranging from producers to government bodies contractually linked, may be necessary when 
market agents fail to negotiate effective contracts that manage the costs and benefits of each 
exchange. In the case of management of JD, markets are unable to successfully negotiate fully 
delimited contracts to appropriately assign the costs and benefits in ways that reduces or 
eliminates JD. Governments have tried and failed to implement JD control programs to eradicate 
the disease, suggesting Mahoney’s theorized vertical contracting is not enough to align risk and 
returns among governments, market agents, and non-governmental organizations to eradicate the 
public and private good problem of bovine JD.  
Internationally, regulators have assessed risks by identifying hazards associated with 
agents that relate to the commodity. To reduce risk of contamination, producer-specific practices 
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are necessary, but often need to be supplemented with other strategies. In the case of foot-and-
mouth disease, good management practices, such as deboning, maturation, and cleaning 
mechanical processing equipment (Garland and de Clercq, 2011) are used to mitigate the spread 
of carrier viruses. Canada has some experience with an E. coli vaccine.  Market incentives highly 
influenced the producers’ willingness to adopt control measures. In this case, governments and 
the markets targeted adoption to those producers more at risk of disease, on the assumption that 
the highest benefits would flow from targeting those most needing to control the disease. The 
conclusion was that a one-size-fits-all approach will yield little benefits in both commercial and 
public safety aspects (Ochieng and Hobbs, 2016).  
There are many voices and interests in each type of good. Common pool goods have 
many interested parties. When organizations and operational models are working collaboratively, 
these actors must also work together. The overall objective for the next section is to unpack the 
type of goods involved in vaccine management for JD and TB and investigate the institutional 
capacity to manage and deliver those goods.  
 To conclude, exploring the options requires a focus on: the cost of the solution and 
benefits and their distribution among the actors involved; the institutions in place and their 
ability to adequately investigate and implement solutions; and the nature of the goods involved. 
The following section unpacks a range of scenarios for delivering and management of JD. 
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Section 4: 
Scenarios 
 
 
As it stands, there are many options open to decision makers attempting to control JD. 
The standard baseline strategy is test-and-cull. This method has been found to be profitable in the 
US if paratuberculosis has a higher prevalence than 5% (Collins and Morgan, 1991). While it is 
good health practice to cull and kill the infected herd, it is also important to note that mid-size 
U.S. commercial dairy farms often choose to retain cows in early infection stages to increase 
farm income (Dorshorst, Collins, and Lomard, 2006).  Clearly cull-and-kill is a suboptimal 
strategy if one seeks to control JD. 
Given that JD is not an immediately-reportable disease, a range of alternative or 
additional strategies may be needed to get to the root of the endemic infection rate, including: 
best-management practices, which would involve government regulators; cull-and-kill, which is 
a process that the dairy producers themselves can manage; vaccination and testing innovations, 
which vaccine producers, institutions such as universities that research on vaccines, dairy 
producers, and government regulators (as vaccines require regulatory approval); and, finally, a 
combination of best management practices, selected vaccination, aggressive testing, and cull-
and-kill, to manage outbreaks. 
 
Scenario 1: The status quo of cull-and-kill 
The cull and kill method involves separation of the infected heifer, calf, or cow from the 
other livestock, and transportation to a killing facility for the livestock to be disposed. Infection 
is detected through two methods: testing of animals and understanding the visible signs of JD, 
which include wasting, diarrhea, and shedding (Donat et al., 2014). Culling and killing relies on 
farmers, governments, and slaughter houses all doing the right thing at the right time. Table 4.1 
illustrates the differential benefits and costs of relying on the cull and kill method. 
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Table 4.1 Scenario 1: Cull and kill strategy 
Actors Benefits Costs 
Dairy 
Producers 
• No future 
production loss 
• Compensation for 
destroyed animals 
($10,000 for 
registered cattle, 
$4,500 for non-
registered cattle)4 
• Loss of animals 
• Loss in revenue and profit 
• Possible loss of trust from the public 
Government - Control of JD  • Economic losses associated with government 
sanctioned clean-up for bio-hazard removal 
• Cost of disease containment in the event of an 
outbreak  
• Economic losses associated with reduced trade 
due to being blacklisted for having infected herds 
• Cost of paying compensation for destroyed 
animals ($10,000 for registered cattle, $4,500 for 
non-registered cattle)5 
Vaccine 
producers 
- N/A • Forgone production 
Public - N/A • Small price increases due to quantity reductions 
• Higher taxes or few services due to public costs 
associated with government sanctioned clean-up 
for bio-hazard removal 
 
It is important to note which institutions are utilized for each scenario. Four institutions 
regulate and implement policies of each scenario. The actors of this scenario are as follows: dairy 
                                                          
4 https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-2000-233/page-2.html 
5 https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-2000-233/page-2.html 
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producers, the government, vaccine producers, and the general public. The role of the actors, 
respectively, is to: produce milk; regulate the good and protect the public; produce (or in this 
case forgo producing) a vaccine; and consume the milk produced. In effect, this scenario is the 
status quo, where the distribution of costs and benefits are accepted (sometimes grudgingly) but 
effectively set the baseline for assessing the other scenarios. 
In this scenario, dairy producers, or the market, is self-regulating. There are no other 
institutions in play when it comes to cull and kill other than the institutions responsible for 
detection and clean-up. In the first instance, dairy farmers incur significant costs for their part in 
the system. When cows present with symptoms of JD then the entire herd at the farm may be 
quarantined, and a thorough fecal culture test can be done to see if any other animals are 
infected. The infected cows are then culled and transported to an abattoir for disposal to reduce 
spread of the disease. Farmers incur transportation costs to send the cows to slaughter, which 
increases the economic loss associated with the infected cow. The farm is then cleansed as 
thoroughly as is possible. Each of these steps imposes significant costs on producers, which 
explains why many may ignore endemic infection. When cull and kill is the go-to strategy of 
disease management, there may also be restrictions on the flow of animals and milk products 
from infected herds, as those farms are no longer reputable sources of safe products. Farmers and 
producers have little to gain when cull and kill strategies are implemented as their herd size is 
reduced due to the culling of their livestock other than potentially eliminating future production 
losses. When the government knows that a specific disease is found in a certain farm the 
government will quarantine the farm. Due to this quarantine, there is a loss in revenue.  In all, 
farmers see cull-and-kill as a necessary but far from a sufficient or satisfactory strategy. 
Government costs associated with cull-and-kill strategies of disease management vary. 
When a disease is found, governments will need to impose quarantines to ensure there is no 
disease outbreak to surrounding farms or wildlife, which creates an additional cost to the 
government. The benefits governments can hope for are that the disease is adequately contained. 
Containment, however, only occurs if there is a rapid response and swift implementation of 
quarantine, which is often not feasible in rural areas where it can take hours or days to get to and 
quarantine a suspected infected farm. This method holds little benefit other than the fact that the 
status quo is maintained which limit costs. The system is adequate, so that there is little interest 
in government changing the status quo.  The only time when government attention is focused is 
29 
 
when the international market determines that animals are infected and disrupts trade flow. If 
producers are unable to supply dairy internationally or locally, then economies are negatively 
impacted and governments respond.  A recent salient example in Canada was the detection of a 
few bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) cases in 2003-5, which led to significant market 
disruption and a sustained and aggressive public response with detection, research and 
management (Stephenson 2013). 
The vaccine and animal health industry are largely not engaged in this scenario.  
Veterinarians are part of the surveillance system, but apart from isolation and cull orders, they 
have little to offer.  While there are no other explicit costs, there is the opportunity cost of 
forgone revenue to vaccine developers and manufacturers.  As with most public policy, however, 
those facing opportunity costs resulting from foregone market opportunities are highly unlikely 
to be engaged in the policy conversation—we will see in other scenarios that these firms will 
have more to contribute to the policy conversation.  
The public ultimately bears much of the cost when cull and kill management practices are 
implemented, either directly or indirectly as citizens and taxpayers. In this scenario, there is a 
modest increase in prices for consumers as supply is reduced, both due to the continuing endemic 
impacts of the disease and the culling of producing animals, and the farmer cost of culling that 
are passed on through the price of milk. The benefits of the cull and kill strategy for the public is 
that the disease will remain contained, albeit not eradicated.  
 
Scenario 2: Renewed management practices  
 Best management practices involve a working understanding of the biology of JD that 
allows producers to integrate JD control measures into management routines (Rossiter and 
Burhans 1996). Capital investments, increased attention to cattle health, and more labour force 
training would all be required to improve JD control (Rossiter and Burhans 1996). Best 
management practices involve things such as erecting new facilities to separate young calf from 
mature cows. By separating calves from mature cows, fecal matter, which is a primary vector for 
transmission, would not be ingested by calves. The separation can be accomplished by simply 
moving infected animals to separate sections of the farm (Rossiter and Burhans 1996). Farmers 
can also manage herds by ensuring calves are not at grass where mature cows were at grass 
(Cetinkaya et al., 1997). Winter housing length and types also factor into best management 
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practices (Cetinkaya et al., 1997). If a calf is housed in a facility that also has mature cows, then 
there is possibility of contamination. Erecting separate facilities aids in this process but is a 
capital investment not every farm can make.  
 
Table 4.2: Scenario 2: Best management practices 
Actors Benefits  Costs 
Dairy Producers • Better disease 
management 
and higher 
productivity 
• Cost of new facilities 
• Small herd size farms are unable to feasibly 
implement practices  
• Public trust could be lost if disease is found on 
premises 
• Unable to trade to exporting countries if 
infections found 
Governments • Better control 
of JD  
• Increased money spent on control, evaluation, 
and man power for inspections  
• Loss of public trust and market disruption if best 
management practices are not implemented 
and/or enforced 
Vaccine 
Producers 
• N/A • Foregone profits 
Public • Lower prices 
due to higher 
productivity 
and less market 
disruption 
• Higher taxes or lower services due to ongoing 
costs and market disruptions 
 
This scenario mobilizes two main actors:  government which works with the industry to 
develop and promote best-management practices, and the dairy farmers who implement the best-
management practices.  
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The benefits of best management practices for producers are that they are able to mitigate 
disease. Control of disease will allow for producer’s reputations to remain intact when trading 
products. Moreover, there is a benefit of not needing to test the entire herd if an infection is 
found. Dairy producers would have more costs associated with implementing best management 
practices such as building new facilities to separate infected or older cows from uninfected or 
young calves, especially for farms with small herds. The other cost associated with best 
management facilities is having additional labour to look after and manage calves and cows that 
are infected. Pillars, Bolton and Grooms (2011) concluded that better management practices 
were a fast and cost-effective way for domestic producers to reduce JD infection rate in US dairy 
herds.  
Compared with the status quo farmers face lower risks of infections but Rossiter and 
Burhans (1996) assert that where trading countries do not vaccinate, there is a higher cost to all 
actors involved (except the vaccine producers who are not involved in management of this 
disease). One challenge is that best management practices are not overly effective for farms with 
small herds. Since herd sizes in Canada vary, it can get costly for SMEs (Kelton et al, 2016). 
SMEs may not adhere to best-management practices resulting in losses associated with infection, 
which negatively affects the industry and market. Moreover, as some producers may not be keen 
on spending the money for the new facilities the government might need to step in to manage the 
risk, which would create a cost for governments. The high entry costs for smaller producers 
could be off-set by introducing government subsidies but this would lead to higher costs to 
governments and in turn to the public as taxpayers.  
Governments benefit from best management practices by having controlled JD and TB 
with costs being borne by producers. This results in enhanced international trading abilities, and 
more movement of animals and their products across borders. Governments do not have many 
costs associated with best management practices. It is the responsibility of the producer to follow 
practices that would reduce infection rates, largely in response to the economic incentive. There 
are only costs if governments choose to ensure compliance of best management practices. 
Ensuring compliance also means regulatory implementation, and harmonization across producers 
within a given territory or among trading partner countries.  
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Vaccine producers do not have benefits from this scenario as they are not active in the 
situation. While vaccine producers would face an opportunity cost that would be unlikely to 
motivate them to engage.  
The cost to the public if best management practices are implemented at the farm level 
depends on whether or not the government chooses to monitor and regulate best management 
practices. If governments do want to regulate the practices, then the programs implemented for 
monitoring will be a cost to the public. Otherwise, there are few other costs to the public except 
for the fact that best management practices alone do not fully control JD, which means that 
infection is still likely to occur. If infection does occur, then there are economic losses. The 
public receives benefits from having the diseases controlled. Additionally, they also receive 
benefits when economic activity is not hampered by infection; a stronger economy leads to better 
opportunities for the entire region.  
While best management practices would generate some improvements over the status 
quo, the distribution of costs and benefits is such that alone it will not fully address the risk of 
outbreaks of JD infection and hence would offer only a modest improvement for the 
marketplace. 
 
Scenario 3: Vaccination without new diagnostics 
Vaccination is the administration of antigenic material (a vaccine) to stimulate an 
individual's immune system to develop adaptive immunity to a pathogen (Gutierrez, Spero, Ga, 
Mirko, De Groot, 2012). Vaccines can prevent or ameliorate infectious disease. Vaccination is 
used for both humans and animals. Vaccines have been regarded as a safe, effective, and cheap 
option to prevent diseases. If many animals in a population are vaccinated, then herd immunity 
can be realized; some assert vaccination above 80-95% are needed to realize herd immunity, 
depending on the infectiousness of the disease.  
 Vaccines have been used for JD since the early 1990s (Bannantine and Talaat, 2015). 
Live attenuated vaccine strains are currently the industry standard (Bannantine and Talaat, 2015). 
The Dutch attempted to utilize killed vaccines to reduce disease. Table 4.3 shows a range of 
vaccines for JD currently in the market. There are no vaccines yet being used in Canada for JD 
as they cause false-positives for TB (Johne’s Disease, 2018).  
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Table 4.3: Recent JD vaccines 
Company Type Source Adjuvant Species/Country 
AquaVax Live 316F Saline sheep (NZ)  
Fort Dodge (Mycopar) Killed M.a.a. strain 18 Oil cattle, sheep (US) 
Fromm Labs, US   Killed M.a.a. strain 18 Oil cattle, goats (US) 
Fromm Labs, US   Live 316F POP Cattle 
Merial (Neoparasec)  Live 316F Oil cattle (Germany); sheep 
(Spain, NZ); goats (France) 
Ovejero (Lio-Johne)  Live 316F Oil sheep (Spain) 
Phylaxia  Killed 5889 Bergey Oil cattle (Hungary) 
Weybridge UK   Live 316F POP cattle, sheep (UK) 
Zoetis (Gudair)  Killed 316F oil sheep (Aus, NZ) 
goats (India, Spain) 
Zoetis (Silirum)  Killed 316F oil cattle (Spain, Aus, USA) 
goats (Spain) 
Note: POP = paraffin, olive oil, pumice stone powder. Source: Bannantine and Talaat (2015). 
 
 Preventing the spread of JD has been demonstrated to be possible through vaccination 
(Bannantine and Talaat 2015). If an animal is vaccinated, then the immune system of the animal 
will attack the virus. Once herd immunity is realized (probably at ranges of 80-95% of all 
animals due to the infectious nature of JD), then there will be a chance to eradicate or at least 
remove the disease from the list of endemic agents. The major problem with traditional 
vaccination of JD is that the resulting antibodies have been found to trigger false-positives in TB 
tests, as mentioned earlier. Moreover, some farmers were found to neglect other management 
practices when using vaccines; vaccines tend to be viewed as the only necessary practice to 
implement to control for JD (McKenna et al. 2006; Schaik et al 1996).  
 Table 4.4 illustrates the differential benefits and costs of introducing a new vaccine, 
albeit without a corresponding diagnostic test to enable regulators and the market to differentiate 
between JD vaccinated animals and TB infected animals. 
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Table 4.4: Scenario 3: Vaccination strategies 
Actors Benefits Cost 
Dairy 
Producers 
• Reduced infection rates and 
higher milk productivity 
• Reduced cull and kill, 
therefore less loss of animals 
• Public and market trust may be 
strengthened 
• Costs of vaccines  
• False positives may still arise 
leading to continuing cull and 
loss of animals 
Governments • Prevent disease from spreading 
• Generate consumer and citizen 
confidence 
• Incentives/educational materials 
generate costs 
Vaccine 
Producers 
• Profits from sale of vaccines 
• Advanced research and 
development as competitive 
advantage  
• R & D and commercialization 
costs 
Public • Reduction in market disruption 
and greater confidence in food 
safety and security 
• Lower risk of catastrophic 
market disruption that would 
generate taxes 
• Some potential increase in milk 
prices as higher costs passed 
along 
• Some continuing public costs of 
implementation that are passed 
along through higher taxes or 
lower services  
 
In this scenario, there is no use of synchronized testing between trading partners. Actors 
in this scenario are the same as the first scenario, but we have more institutions interacting in 
new ways. Dairy producers still self-regulate as they decide when to implement vaccinations, but 
other players and actors are now more actively engaged.   
The costs are still disproportionately distributed. Farmers once again are the center of the 
story.  Assuming an efficacious vaccine can be developed and navigate the regulatory system, 
farmers will ultimately determine if and how it gets used. Evidence suggests farmers receive 
35 
 
benefits in many ways by vaccinating. Firstly, cull and kill usage is reduced since vaccinating 
provides safety from disease spread, which results in less lost income associated with cull and 
kill methods. More directly, farmers that implement vaccines will have stable income, 
production, and trading capabilities. Ugochukwu and Phillips (forthcoming) undertook a survey 
that revealed that 32% of beef farmers and 35% of dairy producers are willing to pay an average 
of CAN$7.50/animal/year for a JD vaccine.  On the extremes, 14% of dairy farmers and about 
6% of beef farmers are willing to pay more than CAN$20/animal/year for JD vaccine, while 
more than 20% of the farmers are not willing to spend more than CAN$5 for a new JD vaccine 
per animal per annum in their operations. So, there may be a sweet spot that would entice 
farmers to vaccinate.   
 
Table 4.5: Farmer’s willingness to pay for vaccine by price 
$/year/animal Beef % Dairy % 
< 5 55 42.6 28 22.5 
5 – 10 41 31.8 43 34.5 
11 – 20 25 19.4 36 29.0 
>20 8 6.2 17 14.0 
Total 129 100.0 125 100.0 
Source:  Ugochukwu and Phillips (2018). 
 
Nevertheless, false positives may still occur, affecting dairy producers negatively, which 
would cause losses of income, product, and future trade. Additionally, farmers would likely have 
to spend more time on implementing vaccines as a management practice. Some smaller farms 
may not have the necessary resources to vaccinate all animals, and sometimes there may be 
educational shortcomings effecting the proper implementation of vaccines. Compared to the cull-
and-kill strategy, the likelihood of contaminated animals disrupting international trade would be 
down, but the risk of false-positives disrupting trade remains high.  Market disruptions are the 
highest cost variable – the Canadian Cattlemen’s Association estimated the BSE crisis of 2003-5 
cost the industry an estimated CDN$6-10 billion (Stephenson 2013).  
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Governments would have a new array of benefits and costs associated with this strategy. 
Governments receive benefits in the form of disease control. When vaccines are implemented, 
the governments and the public they represent are protected. If disease is mitigated then 
economies thrive, and production can continue to benefit the country. On the expense side, there 
may be need to assist farmers to effectively use vaccines. Without adequate education, there is a 
risk they may neglect other management practices that protect their farm from other threats. If 
farmers neglect other best management practices, such as testing and separation of calves from 
mature cows, then there is a chance that other diseases or threats impact the economy negatively 
(Alberta Agriculture and Forestry, Livestock and Crops Division 2015). Similarly, the 
government would be the backstop for the industry if false-positives occur when JD is vaccinated 
using traditional vaccinations. The initial government response to the BSE crisis in Canada in 
2003-5 was an offer of CDN$300 million to support the clean-up and to support the market, so 
this can be a significant cost depending on the degree of market disruption.  
This is no net cost to vaccine producers in this scenario. A viable product in the market 
would only occur if the revenues exceed the variable cost. There is always the risk that the cost 
of research and development may not be fully recouped.  Overall, one would a priori assume that 
vaccine producers would be motivated by this opportunity and more engaged in the policy 
discussion than under the status quo.   
As in the status quo case, consumers are the ultimate payer.  When false-positives occur, 
the economy is negatively affected. If vaccination for JD triggers TB false-positives, the costs of 
quarantine and market disruption would raise costs to taxpayers, while at the same time probably 
raising the cost of milk for consumers.  This is what makes effective control most attractive.  
Effective disease management would control spread of the disease and make our food safer and 
more secure. 
While a vaccine without a complementary test would probably generate a modest 
economic improvement over either of the other scenarios, the risks of unintended market 
disruptions due to false positives for TB would make this an unattractive strategy. Vaccine 
producers might like this option, as it reduces their development costs, but producers and 
governments would find little that attracts them to using this as a major strategy for disease 
reduction.  This approach might work in non-trading countries, but Canada exports such a large 
portion of its cattle herd annually that this is not a practical option.  
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Scenario 4: Combining a new vaccine and diagnostic 
Utilizing and streamlining vaccine use between trading countries is an important facet of 
reducing waste, improving economies, and maximizing production. The strategy currently being 
pursued by the ReVAMP project funded by Genome Canada and undertaken by VIDO-InterVac 
involves developing a new vaccine with companion diagnostic to distinguish between animals 
vaccinated for JD and those that are infected with TB.  Table 4.6 shows the array of benefits and 
costs associated with such a strategy. 
  This scenario has a full array of actors engaged, including dairy producers, governments, 
companies that produce DIVA tests, vaccine producers, and the public. If the actors can be 
motivated, the common–pool problem can be managed by the interplay of public, farmer and 
industry participants. 
The benefits to dairy producers associated with alignment and development of a new 
vaccine and testing tool include: reduced waste due to cull and kill; the potential to develop herd 
immunity and remove JD from the endemic list of diseases; higher productivity; and lower risk 
of false positives that might disrupt the marketplace.  Ultimately, all of these would work to 
increase public trust, which Spriggs and Isaac (2007) assert would help with international 
competitiveness. The main barrier to dairy producers is the cost of vaccinating in small herds as 
they may not be able to offset costs of utilizing a new vaccine. Small herds often are unable to 
access adequate veterinary services to fully utilize the new vaccines. There is also the general 
cost of purchasing the testing kits and vaccines to dairy producers.  
DIVA vaccine tests used by government agencies and importers would help to ensure 
that their product is not infected by disease and that market disruption is not triggered by poor 
testing. DIVA tests ensure that there is enough specificity in the test being used to differentiate 
between different diseases; the low specificity of currently used tests is the trigger for false 
positives for misidentifying JD vaccines as TB infected animals.  
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Table 4.6: Scenario 4: Developing and aligning testing Differentiating Infection in Vaccinated 
Animals (DIVA) and new vaccines 
Actors Benefits Cost 
Dairy Producers 
 
 
• Less cull and kill  
• Lower disease  
• Higher productivity 
• Fewer false positives 
• Public Trust Gained 
• Testing Kits 
• New vaccine purchase 
Governments • Decrease in spread of 
disease, and greater security 
in international trade 
• Administration costs for new 
testing 
• Cost of evaluating the program 
and ensuring compliance 
DIVA test 
Producers 
• Advanced research and 
development as competitive 
advantage 
• Net revenues 
• Risk of producing the good and 
not being used (adopted) by 
many dairy farmers to generate 
profit 
Vaccine 
Producers 
• Advanced research and 
development as competitive 
advantage 
• Net revenues (royalty) 
• Risk of producing the good and 
not being used by many dairy 
farmers to generate profit 
Public • Less likely for disease to 
spread 
• Safe and secured food 
sources 
• Indirect cost when dairy 
producers do not implement other 
best management techniques 
 
Benefits to the government include reducing the spread of disease and improved 
international trade relations. This also would go a long way to securing the economic prospects 
for the dairy industry, reducing costs for farm support. Additionally, when new vaccines are 
implemented, and DIVA tests with higher specificity are aligned amongst trading countries, there 
is less need for quarantine services, and other regulations. Governments would incur some 
related costs, as when a new vaccine and new test is developed government is mandated to 
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review and approve its use. Moreover, there may be some costs to the government from 
dissemination of knowledge to dairy producers of new testing and vaccines. 
Both vaccine producers and diagnostic test producers would be motivated to engage.  In 
the context of ReVAMP, the vaccine and diagnostic are being developed as part of the same 
project by the same entity, but there is no need for that always to be the case. There are sound 
reasons why these two applications might develop independently, as they appeal to different 
needs.  The vaccine would generate demand from farmers as it delivers improved agronomics 
and farm-level risk management, while the diagnostic is more directed at the larger industry and 
government actors.  While obviously similarly motivated by revenues, and possibly by the 
combined increased market value, each generates their value in different parts of the supply 
chain.  There is always the risk that the new vaccines and tests may not realize adequate revenues 
to compensate for the development costs.  As Ugochukwu and Phillips (2018) show, the new 
vaccine is not universally demanded, and the market clearing prices is quite low.   
This scenario offers improved outcomes for consumers.  The result of reducing the spread 
of JD is safer, more nutritious, and more secure milk and related by-products.  Since milk (and 
the meat derived from culled dairy cows) is an important source of nutrition for people of 
different age brackets globally, alignment of disease testing and production of new vaccination 
techniques would yield a global benefit.  
Overall, this scenario would offer the highest benefit-cost ratio and greatest security. As 
with all strategies, however, sometimes a blend is optimal.  Scenario 5 outlines that option. 
 
Scenario 5:  Comprehensive management 
Rather than trying to motivate sub-groups to implement or refine one of the four previous 
strategies, it might be more feasible to motivate all the respective actors—farmers, governments, 
vaccine and DIVA test producers and the public—to pursue a blended or integrated strategy.  In 
past strategies there were unambiguous winners and losers, which complicates action. While 
engaging multiple actors sometimes complicates the process, the advantage is that everyone is 
more likely to contribute if they can see a pay-off, albeit some of those payoffs may have been 
realized with little or no effort in some of the other scenarios.  Table 4.7 lays out the main 
benefits and costs that would emerge from such an engaged strategy. 
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Table 4.7: Scenario 5: Developing new vaccine and aligning testing (DIVA) with best 
management practices 
Actors Benefits Cost 
Dairy Producers • Less cull and kill  
• Lower disease  
• Higher productivity 
• Fewer false positives and 
related market disruption 
 
• Changing best management 
practices and related investments 
to align with new vaccines and 
new tests 
Governments • Decrease spread of 
disease, and increased 
security in international 
trade 
• Administration costs for new 
testing 
• Cost of evaluating the program 
and ensuring compliance 
Vaccine 
Producers 
• Profits 
• Advanced research and 
development as 
competitive advantage 
• Risk of the vaccine not being 
used/adopted by many dairy 
producers 
DIVA Test 
Producers 
• Profits 
• Advanced research and 
development as 
competitive advantage 
• Risk of the vaccine not being 
used/adopted by many dairy 
producers 
 
Public • Less likely for disease to 
spread, and externalities 
associated with trade (and 
the economy) are reduced 
if testing is updated and 
innovative 
• Small tax or program implications 
due to government role 
 
 The costs and benefits are the same in this situation as scenario 4 without the risk of some 
farmers no longer using other best management practices. The additional cost to the government 
is the cost of ensuring compliance.  
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Individually scenario one to four cannot ensure food security, at least partly because the 
costs and benefits are not aligned to motivate all the right actors. While the public and consumers 
will win when JD is controlled, there is no way for all actors to win in these scenarios. The best 
case that should be implemented is when all actors win. All actors involved will win when 
diseases are controlled, and food security is preserved. Each of the first four partial scenarios 
yields various losers. There is no real trend except for the public, who lose in every scenario in 
various degrees; tax money is used when creating a vaccine and implementing a best 
management practice, but with remaining liabilities that would rest with citizens and taxpayers.  
Although scenario five is costly for many of the actors, it is the best case for accomplishing the 
goal of ensuring food security and balancing the risks and rewards.  
 
Summary of Scenarios 
The results of the scenarios are summarized in table 4.8 below. The values were assigned 
based on the severity of the cost being offset by any benefits. If a specific disease management 
method had only costs associated with it, it would be a 5 (worst case) and if the costs were not as 
high as benefits, then the value assigned would be less than 5. When multiple benefits accrue, 
and little cost was seen then the value would continue to decrease.  
The formulation of a vaccine by design will alleviate the issue of false positives. A 
vaccine that surmounts the problem will have less need for a new diagnostic to differentiate 
between vaccinated and TB infected animals, however, diagnostics are still a crucial 
management practice.  
While there is no single unambiguously superior strategy that would mobilize and 
incentivize all the actors to participate with the prospect of improving their lot, the average of the 
ordinal preferences of the five possible actors suggests that the combined strategy laid out in 
scenario 5 is feasible, in that it is one of top preferences of each of the actors, such that each has 
a prospect of improving their circumstances by engaging. 
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Table 4.8: Ordinal ranking of the net benefits by actor and by strategy (1 = best, 5 = worst) 
Actors Scenario 1 
Cull/Kill 
Scenario 2 
Best 
Management 
Scenario 3 
New 
Vaccines 
without a 
DIVA Test 
Scenario 4 
New 
vaccines 
with a new 
DIVA Test 
Scenario 5 
Combined 
strategy 
Dairy 
Producers 
5 4 3 1 2 
Governments 5 3 4 2 1 
Vaccine 
Producers 
5 (tie) 5 (tie) 1 3 2 
DIVA Test 
Producers 
5 (tie) 5 (tie) 5 (tie) 1 2 
Public 5 4 4 2 1 
Average 5 4.2 3.4 1.75 1.6 
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Section 5: 
How to approach JD control through partnership 
 
New vaccines, adoption of best management practices, and new DIVA tests that are more 
specific, sensitive and able to prevent false-positives, would go a long way to reducing instances 
of disease and preserve food security. However, without adequate education for producers they 
may neglect best management practices, and not know about innovations associated with new 
vaccines and DIVA tests. These educational factors suggest that the feasible pathway to reduced 
JD requires involvement and collaboration of the different actors in the system including 
government agencies, veterinarians, and producers of dairy, vaccines, and DIVA tests. 
Ugochukwu and Phillips (2018) conclude that veterinarians are the key to making this work. 
In addition to working with the governments where manufacturing, sale, and testing 
occurs, vaccines and DIVA producers can also partner with veterinary services to bring the tests 
and information to producers to reduce animal diseases. Tablet devices are provided in Italy to 
give farmers access to information and the ability to perform herd-specific support measures. 
National conferences are also used to promote disease and vaccination awareness. Producers in 
Canada could work with multiple levels of government to promote peer-to-peer learning and fine 
tune the incentives for implementing best management practices.  
If companies align strategies with that of regulated trade, there would be reduced risk. 
However, as mentioned earlier, zero risk is next to impossible. Producers working with 
governments to ensure disease surveillance, biosecurity, traceability, and good management 
practices are essential to risk control (Garland, and de Clercq, 2011). Governments could also 
work with universities to train graduates on risk assessment and international trade. Producers 
could help by issuing transparent documents describing the treatment records of their animals, 
including factors required to assess the risk involved. Uttenthal et al. (2010) suggest that 
producers implement a five-year review of vaccines, disease epidemiology, and disease 
instances. The continuous update of archives and vaccine data will allow for better control of the 
risk posed by vaccine market externalities (Uttenthal et al., 2010). The sensitivity and specificity 
of DIVA tests would allow for better risk-management and could alleviate many market 
externalities when companies work with government and vaccination markets.  
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Meanwhile DIVA vaccines with companion diagnostics have been reported to be 
effective in the management of actual infections of diseases like bovine paratuberculosis, 
infectious bovine rhinotracheitis, foot-and-mouth disease, and pseudorabies (Meeusen et al. 
2007). Some European countries already implement this method of testing to reduce the false-
positives found with simply using DIVA and paper trails of vaccine, and other information 
regarding the imported animal or animal product. In the early 1980s, the USA implemented and 
utilized such test kits (Lee, Senne, and Suarez, 2004). 
At the same time, manufacturers could make more effort to use the internet to 
disseminate information on their products and their uses by participating in social media groups, 
subscription memberships, and other big-data users. Manufacturers could also work with the 
government to ensure registered producers have access to internet services to access this 
information by using information on purchased cattle, and other means of information collection 
(Smyth, McDonald, and Falck-Zepeda, 2014).  
The economic losses experienced through ineffective DIVA diagnostics should serve as 
an incentive to farmers and other agents in the bovine vaccine market to innovate and foster 
implementation of policy consistent with a multi-pronged approach to bovine JD eradication. 
Additionally, manufacturers can successfully commercialize vaccines due to the epidemiological 
affirmation in a competitive market (Bioprocess International, 2008). Availability, affordability, 
and accessibility denote an accepting market. In terms of JD in Canada, there is much to be 
desired in terms of availability to rural communities: supplementing vaccines with infrastructure 
to access closed-off markets will increase commercialization viability. Governments may need to 
offer subsidies (possibly linked to regulatory compliance) in order to ensure uptake and use by 
small and rural herds.  Otherwise, there may be no way for a small-sized farm to adopt new 
vaccines and adhere to management practices needed to control JD.   
The risk analysis framework as it relates to bio-safety policy is an effective tool to 
determine how farmers can choose to adopt vaccinations or other forms of disease control 
methods (Phillips and Smyth, 2018). Historically, agriculture has made efforts to evolve and 
adapt to changing environments of risk. Communication of risk through information exchanges 
leads to greater receptiveness of mitigating factors of that risk. This is evident when producers 
and farmers are aware of the dangers and possible losses; they are more likely to participate in 
disease control measures such as vaccinations, and best management practices.  
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Test and cull, vaccination, and management practices alone would appear to be 
ineffective at dealing with JD, but together with information access, there is hope of preventing 
further economic and public good losses (Roth 2011). In order to spur governments, bovine and 
vaccine producers, and veterinarian services into action to tackle the issue of JD, a catalytic 
agent may be necessary. While market disruption is one form of catalytic pressure, it would be 
better public policy if decision-makers and street-level bureaucrats were to anticipate and 
proactively address these risks. It has been theorized that many governments have the necessary 
catalytic agents within their structures - the street level bureaucrat. A public entrepreneur, 
perhaps the chief veterinarian, could be the agent that could start the conversation on improving 
and updating methods to control the diseases mentioned (Tummers, and Bekkers, 2014). These 
agents are in the field and have the contacts required to initiate the process, however, there are 
limitations on what that any single agent might accomplish. In order to maximize the chances of 
success, these street level bureaucrats will need to utilize windows of opportunity that arise from 
any noise made in the dairy space, or other political events that put a focus on the change needed 
in the regulatory space.  
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Section 6: 
Conclusions 
 
 
Milk– a commodity consumed in many countries and economies—is an integral part of 
food security in the world. With growing populations there is a need for complete and adequate 
nutritious foods and milk is one commodity that provides essential nutrients – calcium, protein, 
iodine, potassium, phosphorus and vitamins B2 and B12. Diseases in milk-producing animals, 
such as bovines, however, threaten food security. JD is a threat to milk security as it is an 
endemic disease that affects a large proportion of milk-supplying countries. This poses a cost and 
risk to the general public, and producers that are an integral part of the economy.  
In this thesis, the mechanisms used by regulatory bodies in North America and a few key 
foreign countries that export and import milk products in controlling JD are explored.  The 
problem was framed using the IAD framework to show the actors and institutions involved, the 
scope of good JD management and how the various actors and institutions implement solutions 
via the political feasibility theory. This set up the way in which solutions could be formulated.  
The potential solutions to JD control were described using different scenarios. Scenario 1 
showed that the cull-and-kill method will have many costs to producers of dairy, vaccine and 
DIVA test, the public, and government, with little added benefit. Improved management 
practices illustrated in scenario 2 had a similar problem as scenario 1, but with the added issue of 
unregulated compliance. Using vaccines alone (scenario 3) would not be sufficient to solve the 
false-positive problem that triggers quarantines and loss of production, while using new vaccines 
with a new DIVA test (scenario 4) could result in farmers neglecting other good management 
practices. The proposed solution that would benefit the most and lead to the intended goal of 
food security and reduced economic loss is a combination of new vaccines, new DIVA tests, and 
aligned best management practices.  
In order to effectively achieve this type of solution, many actors will have to work 
together in partnership. Vaccine producers, veterinarians, DIVA test producers, the government 
and farmers will need to collaborate to ensure that best management practices are aligned, which 
would include the use of vaccines and DIVA tests. The government’s policy-makers and street-
level-bureaucrats will need to work closely with the private market.  
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6.1 Policy Implications 
I assert that many actors involved in the proposed solution must act in unison. If the 
government wants to preserve food security and consumer confidence, then regulatory agencies 
must ensure that new vaccine and DIVA testing products are widely available and educational 
materials are provided to farmers. As noted earlier by Ugochukwu and Phillips (2018), there are 
many dairy producers who would be early adopters, and others that would utilize new vaccines 
and tests if the prices are affordable. There is another group that would require incentives to 
pursue changes to their engrained management practices. These groups could be incentivized in a 
variety of ways, such as with subsidies provided by government, or they could simply be 
motivated through educational programs managed by government and veterinarians that show 
them the costs and benefits of adopting aligned management practices with new vaccines and 
DIVA tests. Vaccine developers should be willing partners, as they will want to ensure that their 
product can be successfully adopted by end users by engaging with veterinarians, dairy 
producers, and governments. 
 
 6.2: Extensions 
For any scholar wishing to build upon this work, I suggest reframing the problem to 
determine whether JD is still a major impediment to food security, to assess why government has 
or has not added it to the list of reportable or immediately identifiable diseases, and to challenge 
whether vaccines are necessarily part of the solution set.  
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